INSIDE APARTHEID's PRISON, by Raymond Suttner (Ocean Press, R125)

Bleak memoir has a strong message

The then Natal University law lecturer served seven-and-a-half years from 1975 after being convicted of distributing African National Congress and SA Communist Party literature.

Then, about three years after his release, he was held in "preventative" detention in terms of the state of emergency regulations for another 27 months 18 in solitary confinement for his involvement in United Democratic Front and related organisations' activities.

He was conditionally freed, as his release document stated, because "his psychological health has deteriorated significantly and he is suffering from depression and periodic lapses of memory".

Suttner wrote this book which includes passages from many letters he wrote while in prison in part as a form of therapy, to help him come to terms with the psychological damage his incarceration did to him.

Suttner explains it was not easy for him, a white person who had served "only" 10 years, to do so. He had to overcome concern he would be seen as a prima donna. "What have I to complain about when Nelson Mandela served 27 years?" was the debate he had with himself. It took him a while to convince himself that he did have the right to mourn his imprisonment.

He quotes from a letter to his gran while awaiting trial in 1975, saying he had no regrets about the actions which led to his imprisonment: "That I have done insufficient is what I regret." Twenty-five years later, older and wiser, he observes: "This passage is written in the tone of the revolutionaries I studied and tried to emulate. It is also a good example of my tendency to deny my own pain, because I knew others were experiencing worse."

That pain grew deeper in time, especially during the preventative detention, when he had no fellow prisoners with whom to share his feelings, and no idea how long the ordeal would last.

The book is bleak in the extreme. The section referring to the few days of torture after his 1975 detention is almost as long as the years in Pretoria Central; a reflection of how, in prison, one day is much like the other. Yes, bleak. But a valuable reminder of the horror of apartheid, and why we must say: never again

Alan Fine Monday, 14 January 2002

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Many of the comments of participants indicate an anxiety that something should come out of this conference and I share the desire that our meeting should help us understand the Nordic involvement in our national liberation, as a continuing process-continuing solidarity and deepening of our national and democratic tasks.

I want to begin by asking what may seem a rude question: Do we need this conference? South Africa has thanked the Nordic countries for their support. There are also processes under way for developing our relations at a diplomatic level. What further purpose is served by a conference? I ask as someone who is professionally concerned with relations between South Africa and one of the Nordic countries, Sweden. I would prefer these relations to be based on more than the courtesies and politeness of protocol. For that reason I would resist a conference which is going to repeat what we already know.

In answer to this question, I think the research raises the following important issues about the character of Nordic support and I will try to link some of these to the future:

1. The quantity of humanitarian support was massive. But humanitarian aid was political in that it helped tilt the balance in favour of the democratic forces.

South Africans do not realize the quantities involved. They need to know this. They need to know that when we develop our diplomatic relations with the Nordic countries it is with peoples and governments who have shown through their deeds how greatly they want our national democratic project to succeed.

I want to mention one aspect of humanitarian assistance which concerned me personally. I spent two periods in prison, totalling ten years in the 1970s and 1980s. In the course of these periods I needed legal counsel to defend me and either on my own or with others brought a variety of other (unsuccessful) legal applications- to end prison censorship, for release and other causes. None of us had the resources to bring these cases ourselves.

This money came from somewhere. I did not know where and I did not ask for fear that it was an illegal source, about which I did not `need to know’. I suspected that it was the International Defence and Aid Fund (IDAF), banned in South Africa from 1966, but I had the mistaken impression that because IDAF was in the UK, the funding came overwhelmingly from there. The research makes clear that this was far from the case, apart from a few pence here and there and that the overwhelming majority of the funds came from the Nordic countries, especially Sweden.

This was very important support, sometimes enabling us to exploit the limited legal space that was allowed to detainees under apartheid law, helping to curb some of the most gross attacks on people’s rights, sometimes reducing time spent in jail, sometimes saving people from the gallows.

But also when we were in jail we had expenses. If we were allowed to study, which was not always the case, we needed funds for fees and textbooks. When we were allowed to purchase music and sports equipment (which was not always the case),we needed funds. I do not know precisely where this money came from, but it seems that a sizeable proportion came from the Nordic countries.

These were some of the resources that made it possible to deal constructively with prison life and also provided us with some of the facilities that we used to improve our education and our capacity to contribute further to the struggle on our release. The support nourished our moral, political and personal beliefs in a just cause and came to be part of the alternative fabric of our lives in the hostile and often brutal and inhumane circumstances in which we were held.

This support made it possible for us to survive to fight further battles. Our prison yards and cells became rooms where we argued over political issues, discussed what we managed to glean from the books that were allowed through the censors and learnt from one another . We used our time in jail to improve our understanding of a variety of issues, holding our own seminars and discussions and in general readying ourselves for the moment when we would again be able to play a direct political role.

But the humanitarian support to the ANC, as such, was massive. I was never in exile myself, but as I understand it, Nordic countries literally provided the clothes that people wore, the food that they ate, the funds for their basic sustenance, the educational infrastructure and volunteers in the ANC school, scholarships and support for the ANC Women’s League, as part of their commitment to ensuring gender equality in our democratic development. These things we will never forget. Decades in exile were very traumatic, but the Nordic contribution went some way towards making reasonable living conditions possible. And in a wider sense, the solidarity movement, from letters of support to the concerts held to advance our cause, all strengthened our resolve to win our freedom.

2. What emerges from the research is that Nordic support did not arise from a `top/down’ process. One of its distinguishing features is that it had a popular base. Ordinary people made the representatives of the apartheid regime feel unwelcome on their soil. I know that the noise of angry protesters used to drown out conversations in the South African embassy in the apartheid era. Ordinary people implemented consumer boycotts and made contributions towards funds that supported South African solidarity. The trade unions were key and youth and church people were also. Some outstanding people in advancing our cause in Sweden were the editor Herbert Tingsten, the legendary priest, Rev Gunnar Helander, who today still writes a weekly newspaper column on South Africa in Vasteras and the writer Per Wastberg .

Having this popular base meant that changes of government made little impact on the level and degree of support. It was grounded in Nordic popular consciousness. The compact forged between civil society and state/government was a unique feature of Nordic support for Southern African peoples and movements. This relates to both the strategic significance of Nordic support in the past and also raises questions about possible re-engagement of civil society in the changing `global’ order.

3. There is no doubt that Olof Palme as an individual was a major influencing factor in escalating Swedish, Nordic and broader social democratic support for our struggle. Palme represented a broader rejection of the cold war paradigm being transposed onto liberation struggles. Not only our own, but also that in Vietnam and Nicaragua. There is no doubt that his energy and stature was crucial in mobilising support for our cause.

We need to remember how powerful his anti-imperialism was, that his attacks on the Vietnam war led to the recall of the United States ambassador from Sweden.

4. This brings me to the conjuncture within which Nordic support was provided, which made their contribution have a particular significance. Why did it make a difference? What were the conditions?:

i. In the first place, one of the characteristics of the post WWII world was the cold war, with former allies against fascism lining up in opposite camps. These contending forces ranged themselves in support of and against struggles for self-determination. In particular, the former Socialist countries gave massive support to our struggle, educating thousands of people, providing diplomatic support and military training and equipment In the case of the Cubans we know that they gave their lives in defeating the apartheid forces in Angola.

On the other side the West was in the main unwilling to support our struggle and in the case of the United States, according to documentation quoted by Tor Sellstrom, saw future developments primarily in terms of the white regimes of southern Africa.

ii. Another characteristic of this period was the almost universal decolonisation of Africa and Asia. This was a factor that weakened the ground on which the apartheid regime stood and created diplomatic allies for our struggle and in the long run countries in the front line who sacrificed massively in providing shelter to our cadres and refugees.

iii. Of major significance in Nordic support was that it broke the cold war mould, that Nordic countries were prepared to recognise liberation struggles as having merit in their own right. It was vital for us to not have our aspirations reduced to a battlefield between contending Cold war powers and the Nordic countries, as countries of the West, were vital in breaking this paradigm.

iv. The apartheid regime emerged from the war as a founder member of the United Nations, but it soon found this status under attack as India and emerging independent states launched attacks on apartheid. The regime responded with legalistic arguments, relying on Article 2 (7) of the United Nations Charter preventing discussion of matters falling within the domestic jurisdiction of a state, an argument that at first won support of many western countries including Nordic countries.

v. Over time this conjuncture altered and indeed the efforts of ourselves and our allies, including the Nordic countries, was important in changing the balance of forces. The Sharpeville massacre was a watershed in creating outrage and removing the legalistic fig leaf that the regime used to protect its human rights violations from scrutiny. Article 2(7) of the UN Charter could no longer be used to prevent enquiry.

At the same time, the Sharpeville period opened a phase of massive crackdown on the ANC and its allies and the PAC. It was a period of great difficulty for our movement as it set about rebuilding under new and difficult conditions of illegality.

One of the issues that concerned us then was whether we would be able to rebuild without the regime first re-establishing or recasting its own alliances. In particular, one thing that worried us was that in the event of escalation of our armed struggle and the regime being threatened, it might have been able to rely on countries with heavy investment intervening in its support.

This was not paranoia. It must be remembered that at this time there was evidence of NATO weaponry being used in the Portuguese territories against liberation forces.

Here again, the impact of the Nordic countries was significant. Steps against investment that they initiated acted as a deterrent on the part of others. But also the involvement of NATO members-Norway and Denmark and Iceland in Nordic anti-apartheid solidarity, meant that any attempt to abuse NATO in support of apartheid became more difficult. Norway in fact declared that NATO could not be used in the Portuguese territories-which was a victory for the liberation movements there as well as for us.

vi. We may sometimes forget how difficult the periods were, before we had rebuilt our structures within the country. I was a student in the 1960s and by 1969 there appeared to be no presence whatsoever of the ANC within the country. Censorship laws at any rate ensured that we heard nothing of the liberation movement and I left the country to study in that year, but also with a view to seeing what I could do on my return-not being sure whether there was still an ANC with which I could link up.

vii. The difficult period prior to 1976 was one where the regime boldly tried to create new allies. Vorster had the temerity, we now think, to try and reach out to Africa. But we must remember that there were `takers’. In 1971 Banda of Malawi visited SA amidst much praise for his act as a statesperson. Later in the 1970s Vorster reached out to Ivory Coast, and Ghana then under Busia indicated interest in a `dialogue’. As underground propaganda workers in Durban at the time we brought out a pamphlet called Vukani!/Awake!, attacking these attempts to have dialogue abroad, while suppressing the black population within South Africa. The diplomatic efforts of the liberation movement in the OAU managed to foil Vorster’s efforts.

viii. It was precisely in these difficult years that the Nordic involvement, particularly in Sweden was stepped up and we started to count on their backing in our diplomatic efforts against the regime.

ix. After 1976 a whole new phase of struggle opened up with the regime no longer able to contain resistance in the ways to which it was accustomed. The question then became whether it could establish a new way of ruling, while maintaining apartheid or whether we would be able to defeat any attempts to hold their ground or shift gears

In this period, thousands of people left the country and returned as armed militants of Umkhonto we Sizwe and to a lesser extent PAC.

x. The late 1970s and 1980s saw the opening of yet a new phase, with the reclaiming of legal space in South Africa, democratic forces starting to build organisation and challenge the regime on a new front. This was difficult. We lacked resources. The primary base of the democratic forces, the oppressed black masses, had little funds and to challenge national oppression meant we had to organise nationally-in the factories, in the townships, in the rural areas, amongst women and students. To do this meant having transport and that cost money. To reach people required printing presses and other media. To provide the T shirts with popular slogans which was so characteristic a feature of this period also required funds that the support base did not have.

Here again, the Nordic countries were vital. Their funding was directed towards organisations based in communities. By providing funding they contributed towards long term democratic governance in South Africa. By providing funding for democratic structures they helped root democratic practices, the practices that will be essential if we are to have long term accountable government, popular participation and continued respect for human rights.

At a strategic level they threw in their lot with those forces who wanted to `make apartheid unworkable and South Africa ungovernable. ‘ These, the Nordic countries recognised, were not anarchists but people who in fact wanted peace, which could only be established and sustained in a democratic South Africa.

5. But there is a paradox here. When one reads the literature of the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s it is clear that the former socialist countries and Cuba had some strategic influence on our liberation movement. This is particularly clear in some of the perspectives of the 1969 Morogoro Strategy and Tactics document and even later with the influence of the Vietnam War on ANC military thinking. The Nordic countries on the other hand do not appear to have had or tried to have a major strategic influence on our movement.

In addition, the former socialist countries and Cuba, Vietnam and Nicaragua also provided fruit for ideological and theoretical advances , whatever one may think now of the weaknesses of the socialist project and even its failures. It was for many people in South Africa a source for inspiration, for debate, for vision of the new era, examples that showed that it was possible to defeat imperialist and oppressive forces. The Nordic countries did not offer the vision of revolutionary transformation which was vital to the moral and political energies of the liberation movement for much of its existence. (This is well illustrated in some of the remarks of Trevor Manuel recorded in his interview with Tor Sellstrom. Perhaps at the level of inter-trade union cooperation in the 1980s, some of what I say here ought to be qualified. )

But this is not necessarily something we should criticise. I think it is worthy of credit that they accepted that it was we who had to develop our strategy and they made their contribution within that framework. They were partisans of our cause , though in different ways. And in a context where democratic values, popular participation, peaceful relations and partnerships between peoples and governments are vital for economic development and environmental sustainability, to fight the war against poverty, discrimination, xenophobia, homophobia and prevention of HIV/Aids and to build gender equality -there is much that we can learn from the Nordic countries. There are things that we can learn from the social democratic project in the Nordic countries in terms of concrete solutions to some of the problems that face post apartheid South Africa.

6. But is there nevertheless basis for suggesting that Nordic support was precisely to avert our liberation movement falling under Soviet sway externally and Communist hegemony within the country? In the research this issue is raised occasionally, but mainly in the context of avoiding the solidarity movement falling under left-wing dominance. The implications of this theme are not really elaborated.

In regard to the South African liberation movement there seems to have been an understanding in the Nordic countries that ANC alliance with the Communist Party did not impede ANC independence.

The global context in which Nordic support started to become substantial was one where the dominant western powers were reluctant to offer substantial support to our liberation movement. The Soviet Union and its allies offered unreserved diplomatic support as well as military hardware and training. Clearly the Nordic involvement did have the advantage of demonstrating that some Western powers recognised the legitimacy of struggles for national liberation. Particularly striking was that the Nordic Prime Ministers met the leaders of our liberation movement in 1962, 25 years before any major Western country or leader of the Soviet Union.

7. My response is related to South Africa, but we would not be here, holding a meeting in a democratic South Africa, were it not for the sacrifices of the states of the Southern African region. People shared their countries with our cadres and they paid heavily for this generosity, losing loved ones and almost losing their hard won independence. The emergence of independent neighbouring states was a great strategic boon for us, just as snuffing it out or turning it into something ineffectual was strategically important to the regime.

The Nordic countries gave substantial support to these countries and into SADCC -rightly recognising that the future of the region was intertwined, that one could not just focus on the future `miracle’ South Africa. This holds equally true for today, where the advancing of the concept of an African renaissance is part of the battle for survival of the region, its interdependence on questions of economic development, democracy and peace. In this way the type of regional support provided by Nordic countries in the anti- apartheid period is equally crucial for survival of the region today.

The research also throws light on general strategic questions regarding factors contributing to the success or failure of national liberation projects. It clearly shows how Nordic support empowered liberation movements and organisations on the ground to realize their strategic goals of democratising South Africa. Their support made a difference-it helped shorten the life of the apartheid regime.

8. At the level of the discipline of international theory, the Nordic role made a contribution, in particular in its emphasis on the role of non-state actors in international relations. This applies both to their according recognition to liberation movements but also in the role of solidarity movements in the formation of their foreign policy. It also shows the significant role that middle level powers can play in international relations, particularly when they act within the type of consensus that developed amongst the Nordic countries. This is something on which we hope to rely in the future.

Conclusion

9. It has been difficult to respond to the volumes of research that have been presented to us. As everyone knows, these are massive tomes and we have not had them for very long. Furthermore, some research is closer to completion than others. Consequently it has not been possible to do adequate justice to all the countries and because there is more on Sweden than the others there is more attention given to Sweden.

The research indicates that Nordic support did not happen overnight, that it required a lot of hard work over many, many years, experiencing resistance from sections of Nordic society. In the first place, the missions within South Africa were more attuned to white South Africa than the liberation movement and business interests were very resistant to anything that affected their perceived interests.

10. Although the research is uneven, it nevertheless does show clearly that the process of involvement in anti -apartheid solidarity was uneven. Sweden took the lead and it may have been that its not being a member of NATO gave it more independence -as a state- to do this.

The Nordic support helped swing things: The Nordic countries direct support to the ANC and the democratic formations within the country contributed to our capacity, our ability to take on a very powerful enemy, by helping us with resources for our organisation. We did not have the normal freedom to raise funds for printing presses, transport or hire of venues. Outside funding was crucial. Diplomatic support was essential to isolate the regime and build our own legitimacy.

Now that we have political freedom the future of our relationship has been determined partly by government to government relations, which is close in the case of all the Nordic countries. But that is not the only reason why we look forward to deepening relations. We also rely on continuing people to people relations. The store of goodwill that we have built over the last few decades must be built on in order to develop our friendship in the period that lies ahead.

It must be sustained not only in regard to South Africa, but in relation to the region as a whole. South Africa cannot be developed in isolation from the region. It is essential that Nordic support continues for the region as a whole.

The research presented to this conference helps us understand that our present relationship was built patiently over a long time, not always smoothly. It is with an awareness of this complexity that we equip ourselves better to move on and build still stronger ties between our peoples.

Finally, I want to pay tribute to the late President Oliver Tambo who did so much to build the international pillar of our struggle and in particular relationships between ANC and the Nordic peoples.
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NOTE: I am a serving ambassador of South Africa to Sweden. This paper does not represent an official position of the government of South Africa but is my own understanding as a person who was involved as a UDF and ANC activist in the struggle for liberation in South Africa.

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